Why Tolerate Religion? by Leiter, Brian
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
2008
Why Tolerate Religion?
Brian Leiter
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leiter, Brian, "Why Tolerate Religion?" (2008). Constitutional Commentary. 96.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/96
Articles 
WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 
Brian Leiter* 
I. PRINCIPLED TOLERATION 
Religious toleration has long been the paradigm of the lib-
eral ideal of toleration of group differences, as reflected in both 
the constitutions of the major Western democracies and in the 
theoretical literature explaining and justifying these practices. 
While the historical reasons for the special "pride of place" ac-
corded religious toleration are familiar, 1 what is surprising is that 
* Hines H. Baker & Thelma Kelley Baker Chair in Law. Professor of Philosophy. 
and Director of the Law & Philosophy Program. The University of Texas at Austin. I am 
grateful to John Gardner and Tony Honore for inviting me to present an early version of 
some of this material to their "Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy" seminar at Ox-
ford in December 2005. and to them and the students in the seminar for helpful com-
ments. Law and philosophy students in my spring 2006 seminar on "Toleration" at the 
University of Texas at Austin have helped me clarify my thoughts on this subject. An 
earlier version of this essay was presented as the 'Or ·Emet Lecture at Osgoode Hall 
School of Law of York University. Toronto in March 2006: later versions benefited from 
comments at faculty workshops at the University of Chicago Law School. Chicago-Kent 
College of Law. and the University of Minnesota Law School; from those who attended 
the Keynote Address at the Graduate Conference sponsored by the Department of Phi-
losophy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; from an audience at Colgate 
University who attended a public lecture sponsored by the Department of Philosophy; 
and from the participants in the Kline Colloqium sponsored by the Department of Phi-
losophy at the University of Missouri. Columbia. I should mention. in particular. helpful 
conversations with or comments from Larry Alexander. Robert Audi. Curtis Bridgeman. 
David Brink. John Deigh. Strefan Fauble. Naomi Gouldner. Leslie Green. Abner 
Greene. Ross Harrison. Kenneth Himma. Paul Horwitz. Shelly Kagan. Brian Kierland. 
Andrew Koppelman. Adrienne Martin. Martha Nussbaum. Michael Paulsen. Richard 
Posner. Larry Sager. Adam Samaha. Steven Shiffrin. Sheila Sokolowski. David Strauss. 
Cass Sunstein. Patrick Todd. and Mark van Roojen. 
1. See. e.g .. Douglas Laycock on the American constitutional experience: "[I]n 
history that was recent to the American Founders. governmental attempts to suppress 
disapproved religious views had caused vast human suffering in Europe and in England 
and similar suffering on a smaller scale in the colonies that became the United States ... 
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no one has been able to articulate a credible principled argument 
for tolerating religion qua religion: that is, an argument that 
would explain why, as a matter of moral or other principle, we 
ought to accord special legal and moral treatment to religious 
practices. There are, to be sure, principled arguments for why 
the state ought to tolerate a plethora of private choices, com-
mitments, and practices of its citizenry, but none of these single 
out religion for anything like the special treatment it is accorded 
in, for example, American and Canadian constitutionallaw.2 So 
why tolerate religion? Not because of anything that has to do 
with it being religion as such- or so I shall argue. 
To see why this is so we will need to start with some distinc-
tions that make possible a more perspicuous formulation of the 
question. In particular, we need to state clearly what is at stake 
in something called a "principle of toleration." I shall take as a 
point of departure a useful formulation of the issues by the late 
English philosopher Bernard Williams: 
A practice of toleration means only that one group as a mat-
ter of fact puts up with the existence of the other, differing, 
group .... One possible basis of such an attitude ... is a virtue 
of toleration, which emphasizes the moral good involved in 
putting up with beliefs one finds offensive .... If there is to be 
a question of toleration, it is necessary that there should be 
some belief or practice or way of life that one group thinks 
(however fanatically or unreasonably) wrong, mistaken, or 
undesirable.' 
For there to be a practice of toleration, one group must deem 
another differing group's beliefs or practices "wrong, mistaken, 
or undesirable" and yet "put up" with them nonetheless. That 
means that toleration is not at issue in cases where one group is 
simply indifferent to another. I do not "tolerate" my neighbors 
who are non-White or who are gay, because I am indifferent as 
Douglas Laycock. Religious Liberty as Liberty. 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313. 317 
(1996). 
2. The Canadian Charter does. at least. recognize in the text liberty of ··con-
science:· along with religious liberty. but in practice. the protection for religious con-
science turns out to be stronger. Some U.S. Supreme Court cases. involving constitu-
tional challenges to the Universal Military Training and Service Act. have moved in the 
direction (at least for "conscientious objectors·· to military service) of expanding the 
meaning of "religion·· to encompass broader ccmmitments of conscience. See esp .. Welsh 
v. United States. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Even here. this was framed as a matter of statutory 
interpretation. not constitutional principle. 
3. Bernard Williams. Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?. in TOLERATION: AN 
ELUSIVE VIRTUE 18.19 (David Heyd ed .. 1996). 
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to the race or sexual orientation of those in my community. 
"Toleration," as an ideal. can only matter when one group ac-
tively concerns itself with what the other is doing. believing. or 
"being." Obviously, in many cases, the attitude of "indifference" 
is actually morally preferable to that of "toleration": better that 
people should be indifferent as to their neighbors' sexual orien-
tation than that they should disapprove of it, but "tolerate" it 
nonetheless. 
But a practice of toleration is one thing, a principled reason 
for toleration another. Many practices of toleration are not 
grounded in the view that there are moral reasons to tolerate dif-
fering points of view and practices, that permitting such views 
and practices to flourishes is itself a kind of good or moral right, 
notwithstanding our disapproval. Much that has the appearance 
of principled toleration is nothing more than pragmatic or, we 
might say, "Hobbesian" compromise: one group would gladly 
stamp out the others' beliefs and practices, but has reconciled it-
self to the practical reality that they can't get away with it, at 
least not without the intolerable cost of the proverbial ''war of 
all against all." To an outsider, this may look like toleration-
one group seems to "put up'' with the other- but it does not 
embody what Williams called a "virtue" of tolerance (or what I 
will call "principled" tolerance), since the reasons for putting up 
are purely instrumental and egoistic, according no weight to 
moral considerations. One group "puts up" with the other only 
because it wouldn't be in that group's interest to incur the costs 
required to eradicate the other group's beliefs and practices. 
But it is not only Hobbesians who mimic commitment to a 
principle of toleration. On one reading of Locke,4 his central 
non-sectarian argument for religious toleration is that the coer-
cive mechanisms of the state are ill-suited to effect a real change 
in belief about religious or other matters. Genuine beliefs, sin-
cerely held, can't be inculcated at gunpoint, as it were, since they 
respond to evidence and norms of rational justification, not 
threats.' In consequence, says the Lockean, we had better get 
used to toleration in practice-not because there is some princi-
4. Jeremy Walclron. Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution. in 
JUSTIFYING TOLERATION: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES o] (Susan 
Mendus ed .. 1988). 
5. Locke puts a distinctively Protestant ··spin·· on this epistemological point. since 
he believes that salvation can only come through a free (i.e .. uncoerced) embrace of reli-
gious doctrine. On that Protestant view. there would be no point in non-toleration. since 
it would not accomplish any meaningful religious objective given the prerequisites for 
salvation. 
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pled or moral reason to permit the heretics to flourish, but be-
cause the state lacks the right tools to cure them of their heresy, 
to inculcate in them the so-called "correct" beliefs. 
Locke, it is fair to say, did not fully appreciate the extent to 
which states and-in capitalist societies-private entities can 
employ sophisticated means to effectively coerce belief, means 
that are both more subtle and more effective than he imagined. 
That history offers up so many examples of societies in which the 
tyranny of the few over the many is accepted by the many as a 
quite desirable state of affairs is compelling evidence that states 
can successfully inculcate beliefs, even dangerously false beliefs. 
Locke's "instrumental" argument for a practice of toleration 
should provide little comfort to the defender of toleration given 
Locke's (understandable) failure to appreciate the full complex-
ity of the psychology and sociology of belief inculcation. 
Not only Hobbesians and Lockeans, however, mimic princi-
pled toleration. A variation on the Lockean instrumental argu-
ment for toleration is apparent in a popular theme in American 
political thinking-one that receives a well-known articulation in 
Frederick Schauer's defense of free speech" -according to which 
government can't be trusted to discharge the task of intolerance 
"correctly," that is, in the right instances. Speech can harm, in all 
kinds of way, notes Schauer, and the various rationales for put-
ting up with these harms-from John Stuart Mill's "marketplace 
of ideas" to Alexander Meiklejohn's conception of free speech 
as essential to democratic self-government-almost all fall prey 
to objections of one kind or another. But, says Schauer, there is 
still a reason to demand that the state "tolerate" many different 
kinds of speech (even harmful speech), and that is because there 
is no reason to think the state will make the right choices about 
which speech ought to be regulated. Schauer calls this "the ar-
gument from governmental incompetence,"7 and says, 
Freedom of speech is based in large part on a distrust of the 
ability of government to make the necessary distinctions, a 
distrust of governmental determinations of truth and falsity, 
an appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and a 
6. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). See 
also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 73-92 (Elizabeth Rappaport. ed .. Hackett 1978) 
for similar considerations. 
7. SCHAUER, supra note 6. at 86. 
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somewhat deeper distrust of governmental power in a more 
8 general sense. 
5 
It is not, then, as in the Lockean argument, that government 
lacks the right means for bringing about intolerant ends, it is 
rather that government is not competent, that is, can not be re-
lied upon, to deploy its means in the right cases. Perhaps this 
kind of instrumental argument for state toleration is more plau-
sible, but its justificatory structure makes it no different from 
that of the Lockean's: it doesn't tell us why we, morally, ought 
not to crush differing beliefs or practices, it tells us only that we 
(through the instrumentality of the state) are unlikely to do it 
right. 
Where a genuine "principle of toleration" gets its purchase 
is in the cases where one group (call it the "dominant" group) 
actively disapproves of what another group (call it the "disfa-
vored" group) believes or does; where that dominant group has 
the means at its disposal to effectively and reliably change or end 
the disfavored group's beliefs or practices; and yet still the 
dominant group acknowledges that there are moral or epistemic 
reasons (that is, reasons pertaining to knowledge or truth) to 
permit the disfavored group to keep on believing and doing what 
it does. That is pure or "principled" toleration,9 and the question, 
then, is whether there is such a reason to tolerate religion. 
My concern here shall mainly be with the principled 
grounds of state toleration, as opposed to toleration in interper-
sonal relations, though the issues are often similar. But for pur-
poses of the argument, I shall confine my attention to the princi-
pled reasons why the state should refrain from a distribution of 
benefits and burdens that has as its intended consequence the 
disfavoring of religion or of particular religions. I frame the 
problem in these terms because, even though the historical prob-
lem about religious toleration was generated by conflict among 
religious groups, the contemporary problem, at least in the post-
Enlightenment, secular nations (of which the United States may 
still be one) is different: it is why the state should tolerate relig-
ion as such at all. 
8. /d. 
9. "Pure" or "principled" because the reasons for toleration are not based on self-
interest, at least not directly. 
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II. PRINCIPLED ARGUMENTS FOR TOLERATION 
Before we consider religious tolerance in particular. it will 
be useful to consider the general structure of principled argu-
ments for state toleration of group differences. The literature on 
the subject is voluminous, so necessarily I will be able to con-
sider only a few themes here. Yet the themes I emphasize will, I 
believe, capture the main principled positions in the debates. 
We can distinguish between two broad classes of principled 
arguments for toleration, which I will call "moral" and "epis-
temic" (though the latter incorporates some moral considera-
tions as well). The strictly moral arguments for toleration claim 
either that there is a right to the liberty to hold the beliefs and 
engage in the practices of which toleration is required; or that 
toleration of those beliefs and practices is essential to the realiza-
tion of moral goods. The moral arguments divide, predictably 
enough, into Kantian and utilitarian forms. 10 
As paradigmatic of the broadly Kantian arguments, con-
sider the Rawlsian theory of justice according to which 
·'[t]oleration .. .follows from the principle of equalliberty,"11 one 
of the two fundamental principles of justice that, Rawls argues, 
rational persons would choose in what he calls the "original posi-
tion." The ''original position" is a situation in which people 
choose the basic principles of justice to govern their societies, 
and in which they do so deprived of the kind of information 
about their place in society that would render their judgments 
partial and self-serving. As Rawls puts it: 
[T)he parties must choose principles that secure the integrity 
of their religious and moral freedom. They do not know, of 
course, what their religious or moral convictions are, or what 
is the particular content of their moral or religious obligations 
as they interpret them .... Further, the parties do not know 
how their religious or moral view fares in their society, 
whether, for example, it is in the majority or the minority .... 
[E)qualliberty of conscience is the only principle that the per-
sons in the original position can acknowledge. They cannot 
take chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant re-
ligious or moral doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if 
10. Since I want to keep the focus squarely on toleration. I am going to take no po-
sition on the relative merits of the Kantian and utilitarian defenses, especially since the 
moral and political philosophy of the last 200 years has made no meaningful progress on 
this issue. 
II. JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 214 (1971) (hereinafter. RAWLS. 
JUSTICE]. 
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it wishes. Even granting ... that it is more probable than not 
that one will turn out to belong to the majority (if a majority 
exists), to gamble in this way would show that one did not 
take one's religious or moral convictions seriously, or highly 
value the liberty to examine one's beliefs. 12 
7 
Notice that nothing in this argument is specific to religion: the 
argument, as Rawls says quite clearly, is on behalf of rights se-
curing "liberty of conscience," which can include, of course, mat-
ters of conscience that are distinctively religious in character, but 
are not limited to them. 13 
The utilitarian arguments have a similar feature, namely, 
that they do not obviously single out religion for special consid-
eration as opposed to other important matters of conscience. 
These arguments come in many different varieties, but all share, 
in one form or the other, the core idea that it maximizes human 
well-being-however exactly that is to be understood-to pro-
tect liberty of conscience against infringement by the state. 14 
Why does it promote human well-being to protect liberty of 
conscience? Many of the arguments trade, at bottom, on a sim-
ple idea: namely, that being able to choose what to believe and 
how to live (within certain side-constraints, about which more 
shortly) makes for a better life. Being told what you must believe 
and how you must live, conversely, makes lives worse. I shall 
gloss this simple thought as the "Private Space Argument." It 
maximizes human well-being, so the argument goes, if, within 
certain limits, individuals have a "private space" in which they 
can freely choose what to believe and how to live. 
12. /d. at 206--07. 
13. I am going to ignore in this essay the later revision of Rawls's views. marked by 
JOHN RAWLS. POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993 ). since its concerns are inapposite for the 
principled argument here. In this later work. Rawls comes to the view that (as Freeman 
puts it) "any traditional moral conception (justice as fairness [i.e .. the conception of A 
Theory of Justice] included) is not feasible so far as it aspires to be the public grounding 
of substantive moral and political principles ... Samuel Freeman. The Burdens of Public 
Justification: Constructivism, Contractualism, and Publicitv. 6 POL.. PHIL. & ECON. 5. 9 
(2007). The moral theory of A Theory of Justice is now t~eated as another "comprehen-
sive" doctrine that might be reasonably rejected by the members of a pluralistic society 
that liberalism aims to govern. and so fails by the standards of reasonable "public justifi-
cation" such a society demands. But how could a theory of justice function as a merely 
"political" theory. one stripped of its controversial moral. metaphysical. and epistemo-
logical doctrines? I am sympathetic to those who do not think this works and that. in par-
ticular. its account of "reasonableness" is woefully undertheorized. See. e.g .. GERALD 
GAUS. JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM: AN ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL 
THEORY (1996). for one trenchant critique. 
14. A good recent example is TIMOTHY MACKLEM. INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 119-
54 (2006). 
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Is it true that granting individuals a "private space" maxi-
mizes human well-being? Could it be that many, perhaps even 
most, individuals make themselves miserable, i.e., worse-off, 
precisely because they make foolish choices about what to be-
lieve and how to live--or perhaps because they don't make real 
choices at all, being hostage to social and economic milieu and 
enjoying only the illusion of choice? These illiberal thoughts-
familiar to readers of Plato, Marx, and Marcuse, among many 
others-have little purchase these days within the mainstream of 
English-speaking moral and political theory, though not, as far 
as I can tell, because they have been refuted systematically.15 For 
the sake of argument here, I shall put these doubts to one side 
and grant that the Private Space Argument is plausible, and thus 
states a utilitarian ground for toleration. 
In contrast to the moral arguments for toleration which we 
have just considered, epistemic arguments for toleration empha-
size the contribution that tolerance makes to knowledge. Such 
arguments find their most systematic articulation in the work of 
John Stuart Mill. According to Mill, toleration is necessary be-
cause (1) discovering the truth (or believing what is true in the 
right kind of way) contributes to overall utility; and (2) we can 
only discover the truth (or believe what is true in the right way) 
in circumstances where different beliefs and practices are per-
mitted to flourish. 16 The first premise in the Millian argument for 
toleration is, quite obviously, a moral one: we should care about 
the truth (or believing the truth in the right kind of way) because 
of the contribution that makes to the morally valuable end of 
utility. Nietzsche, among others, denies the moral premise: the 
"truth is terrible," says Nietzsche,17 by which he means precisely 
that sometimes knowing the truth is incompatible with life, a for-
tiori, with utility (though utility was not, of course, Nietzsche's 
particular concern). 
It is only the second premise of the Millian argument for 
toleration that is distinctively epistemic: for it is this premise that 
claims that toleration of divergent beliefs and practices contrib-
utes to knowledge of the truth. Note that the "truths" at issue for 
15. Michael Rosen's critique of Marx's thesis about false consciousness is an excep-
tion. See MICHAEL ROSEN, ON VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE: FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1996). I do not think that critique is successful. See Brian 
Leiter, The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, in THE 
FUTURE FOR PHILOSOPHY 74, 84--87 (Brian Leiter ed., 2004). 
16. MILL, supra note 6, at 15-72 
17. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ECCE HOMO 326 (W. Kaufmann trans., Vintage 1967). 
2008] WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 9 
Mill concern both truths about "facts" as well as truths about 
"value" -in particular, moral truths about the best kinds of lives 
available to creatures like us. From an epistemic point of view, 
both factual and moral truths have several features in common. 
First, in neither case are we justified in assuming that we are in-
fallible: we may be wrong, and that is a reason to permit dissi-
dent opinions, which may well be true. Second, even to the ex-
tent our beliefs are partially true, we are more likely to 
appreciate the whole truth to the extent we are exposed to dif-
ferent beliefs which, themselves, may capture other parts of the 
truth. Third, and finally, even to the extent our present beliefs 
are wholly true, we are more likely to hold them for the right 
kinds of reasons, and thus more reliably, to the extent we must 
confront other opinions, even those that are false. For all these 
epistemic reasons, toleration of a wide array of expression of dif-
fering beliefs is warranted according to Mill. 
Moral truths, however-that is, truths about how we ought 
to live-supply the ground for a wider scope of toleration, one 
that encompasses practices, not just beliefs. For the epistemic 
conditions for the discovery of moral truths require not only that 
we be exposed to differing beliefs, but that, as Mill puts it, "the 
worth of different modes of life should be proved practically" 
through what Mill calls "experiments of living. "1R In other words, 
to know how we really ought to live, it is not enough to hear dif-
fering opinions expressed on the subject; one must have the em-
pirical evidence provided by lives actually lived in accordance 
with different guiding principles. It is only, for example, by see-
ing (or, better yet, experiencing) the lives of a pig satisfied and 
Socrates dissatisfied (in Mill's famous example) that we can 
come to the knowledge that the latter life is better, i.e., involves 
higher quality pleasures, than the former. 
Before we turn to the special case of religious toleration, we 
need to call attention to one more feature of principled argu-
ments for toleration: namely, that they all recognize side-
constraints on the scope of toleration.19 Even if there is a right to 
liberty of conscience which demands state tolerance of differing 
beliefs and practices, as Rawls holds; or even if toleration pro-
motes overall utility or happiness-or facilitates a kind of 
knowledge which promotes overall utility-as the utilitarian ar-
18. MILL. supra note 6. at 54. 
19. An early conversation with Ross Harrison was helpful in clarifying my thinking 
on this topic. 
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guments hold: it is still the case that there are limits on how 
much toleration is demanded. 
For the Rawlsian, ''The limitation of liberty is justified only 
when it is necessary for liberty itself, to prevent an invasion of 
freedom that would be still worse,"20 so "liberty of conscience is 
to be limited only when there is a reasonable expectation that 
not doing so will damage the public order which the government 
should maintain."21 "This expectation," he adds, "must be based 
on evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all."22 For the 
utilitarian, by contrast, the side-constraints on toleration are 
typically set by some version of Mill's famous Harm Principle, 
according to which "the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. "23 
On either theoretical approach, the limits of tolerance are 
set by the liberty interests or well-being of others in the commu-
nity, and these limits have their primary impact not on toleration 
of beliefs but on toleration of the practices or actions undertaken 
in accord with those beliefs. The state will still, on either the 
Rawlsian or Millian view, it seems, have to tolerate some reli-
gious group's belief that adherents of all other religions are here-
tics, destined for damnation; but the state need not tolerate that 
same group's desire to act on its beliefs, by, for example, killing 
the infant children of the alleged heretics before their souls are 
corrupted, and thus eternally damned, by heresy. 
Cases like these are, of course, the easy cases on any view of 
toleration and its limits. Much harder are two other kinds of 
cases: first, those involving the expression of beliefs that have as 
their probable (but not certain) consequence actions that in-
fringe upon liberty or are otherwise likely to cause prohibited 
harms; and second, those involving practices or actions that have 
as their probable (but not certain) consequence the infringement 
of liberty or the causing of prohibited harms. 
Mill is, of course, thinking of the first category of cases 
when he writes that, 
[E]ven opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances 
in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their ex-
pression a positive instigation to some mischievous [i.e., harm-
20. RAWLS. JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 215. 
21. /d. at 213. 
22. /d. 
23. MILL. supra note 6. at 9. 
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ful] act. An opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor, 
or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested 
when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur 
punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assem-
bled before the house of a corn dealer .... 24 
11 
That same thought is codified in American constitutional law by 
the doctrine that speech which poses a "clear and present dan-
ger" can be suppressed by the state.25 This approach supposes 
that you can hold and express any belief unless there is a "tight" 
causal nexus between expression of the belief and forbidden 
acts. The Rawlsian view seems to come to the same thing, 
though the metaphors Rawls employs are different: the threat to 
liberty, he says, for example, "must be securely established by 
common experience."26 The Rawlsian formulation does not as 
obviously incorporate a requirement that the resultant harm be 
as immediate or imminent as do the Millian examples or the 
American constitutional doctrine. It suffices on the Rawlsian 
view that the causal nexus between expression of belief and lib-
erty-infringing act be "securely established." To be sure, the cri-
teria for securely establishing that nexus may only be satisfied in 
the same cases of immediate or imminent harmful conduct con-
templated on the Millian view, which is reason to think they 
come to the same thing. 
The second category of cases presents the same issue: that 
is, there are practices based on beliefs which it seems ought to be 
tolerated (on either the Millian or Rawlsian view) about which 
we can ask whether those practices might stand in a causal nexus 
with harm that satisfies the applicable evidential standards. The 
recent Canadian case27 involving the right of Sikhs to carry the 
kirpan (a ceremonial knife), as required by their religion, even in 
schools, illustrates this issue. Those opposing the practice ar-
gued, in part, that this religious practice poses too great a risk of 
harm, reflected on the general ban of weapons in school; the 
other side argued, by contrast, that the probability of harm was 
very slight, as evidenced, for example, by the fact that there was 
no known instance of a kirpan being used as a weapon. The 
24. !d. at 53. 
25. The "'clear and present danger"' test comes from the U.S. Supreme Court opin-
ion in Schenck v. U.S. 249 U.S. 47. 52 (1919). It has been replaced. as a matter of doc-
trinal formulation. by the idea of "'imminent lawless action"' in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444.447 (1969). 
26. RAWLS. JUSTICE. supra note 11. at 215. 
27. Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys. [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256. 
2006 SCC 6 (Can.). 
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Court, of course, opted for toleration of the practice of carrying 
the kirpan, given the importance of the practice to the believers, 
the putatively slight risk of harm, and the special value multicul-
turalism is assigned in the Canadian Charter. 
III. IS RELIGION SPECIAL FROM THE STANDPOINT 
OF PRINCIPLED TOLERATION? 
In asking whether there is something special about religion 
that bears on religious toleration, we are not asking whether 
there is some feature (or features) of religious belief that war-
rant principled toleration of religion on either moral or epistemic 
grounds. There plainly are such features, for example, that reli-
gious beliefs are often matters of conscience, and thus would fall 
within the scope of any argument, like the Rawlsian one, for pro-
tecting liberty of conscience. If there is a special reason to toler-
ate religion it has to be because there are features of religion 
which warrant toleration and these features are either:28 
1. Features that all and only religious beliefs have, ei-
ther as a matter of (conceptual or other) necessity or 
as a contingent matter of fact; or 
2. Features which other beliefs have, or might have, but 
which in these other cases possession of the features 
would not warrant principled toleration. 29 
I am hard-pressed to think of features of religion that satisfy 
the second category, so I shall put that possibility to one side 
here. Are there, then, features of religious belief that, either 
necessarily or simply contingently, distinguish religious beliefs 
from other kinds of belief that might warrant toleration? 
The general question of what distinguishes "religion" has 
been extensively discussed in the constitutional literature, 
though often with an eye to purely doctrinal questions about the 
meaning of a particular constitutional provision within a particu-
28. This formulation owes much to David Kill oren. 
29. There is a variant on this possibility, namely, features which are not unique to 
religious belief. but which are nonetheless more salient. or more urgent, when annexed to 
religious beliefs than when not. We need not go so far as to say that when not annexed to 
religion they don't warrant principled toleration at all. It might be enough that the case 
for toleration is strongest in the case of religion. Again, as with (2), in the text, I am not 
sure what those features might be. (Thanks to Les Green for clarification on this point.) 
Brian Kierland also points out to me, correctly. that what is really at issue here are 
svstems of religious belief, not necessarily individual beliefs. For ease of discussion. I will 
r~fer to beliefs simpliciter, but I don't think the failure to spell out the notion of system. 
and membership in the system, will be significant for what follows. 
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lar constitutional tradition and socio-political context.") Being 
concerned with questions of statutory or constitutional meaning. 
these approaches do not necessarily grapple with what makes re-
ligion morally or epistemically distinctive from the standpoint of 
principled toleration. The inquiry here is to figure out what is 
distinctive about religion such that religion ought to be tolerated, 
quite apart from any particular legal regime. An answer to that 
question will permit us then to return to actual constitutional 
protections to see whether they are justifiable from a principled 
point of view. 
The legal philosopher Timothy Macklem is unusual in hav-
ing addressed our question directly in a 2000 article on "Faith as 
a Secular Value" in the McGill Law Journat and in his recent 
book on the philosophical foundations of the individual liber-
ties.32 According to Macklem, what distinguishes religious belief 
is that it is based on faith, not reasons. As he puts it: 
[F]aith itself provides the moral basis for freedom of relig-
ion .... At its most basic level, the concept of faith describes 
the manner in which a particular belief or set of beliefs may 
be subscribed to by human beings. In that sense of the word, 
faith exists as a form of rival to reason. When we say that we 
believe in something as a matter of faith . . . we express a 
commitment to that which cannot be established by reason, or 
30. See, e.g., Abner Greene. The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses. 102 
YALE LJ. 1611 (1993). which treats an extrahuman source of normative authority as dis-
tinctive of religion and thus as doing justice to the understanding of religion in the 
American context. Andrew Koppelman rejects Greene's view for its tethering of religion 
to theism. proposing instead that religion includes "all belief systems that make ultimate 
claims about the meaning of human existence." Andrew Koppelman. Secular Purpose, 88 
VA. L. REV. 87, 135 (2002). This is rather obviously over-inclusive. as Koppelman effec-
tively concedes when subsuming Nietzsche's philosophy under the rubric of religion so 
defined (id. at 131)-and, of course, it would not only be Nietzsche's philosophy that 
would turn out to be a "religion" on this view. Some other writers (in different forms, 
Justices Scalia and Thomas. as well as John Finnis and Michael McConnell) contend that 
religion should be singled out for legal solicitude because it is "good." for society or for 
the believer or perhaps both. (In a sense. Timothy Macklem's argument [discussed. be-
low. in the text] is a more sophisticated version of this position.) But that. of course. begs 
the question of what religion is. and the answers these writers offer turn out to be over-
and under-inclusive in rather obvious ways. See. e.g .. Koppelman's criticism of Finnis on 
this score. /d. at 130. 
Many other writers seem attracted to Kent Greenawalt's view that we should eschew 
definitions of religion. in favor of looking at "indisputable instances" and then arguing by 
analogy to other cases, even when all the cases taken together do not share common fea-
tures. See Kent Greenawalt. Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL L. 
REV. 753.763 (1984). The problem with this kind of approach from a moral point of view 
is well-discussed by Macklem. MACKLEM. supra note 14, at 120-26. 
31. Timothy Macklem. Faith as a Secular Value. 45 MCGILL L.J. 1 (2000). 
32. MACKLEM. supra note 14. 
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to that which can be established by reason but not for that 
33 
reason. 
According to Macklem, faith is required "[w]here the quest for 
reasons is impossible, but commitment [even without reasons] is 
potentially valuable"34 and so, even from a secular perspective, 
we have reason to value faith and tolerate it.35 
Remarks by a prolific American scholar of law and religion, 
John Witte, Jr., suggest a second important feature of religion 
for purposes of our question. Professor Witte sounds familiar 
themes when he writes: 
[R ]eligion is special and is accorded special protection in the 
[American] Constitution .... The founders' vision was that re-
ligion is more than simply a peculiar form of speech and as-
sembly, privacy and autonomy. Religion is a unique source of 
individual and personal identity, involving "duties that we 
owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging them," as 
Madison put it. Religion is also a unique form of public and 
social identity, involving a vast plurality of sanctuaries, 
schools, charities, missions, and other forms and forums of 
faith._ll, 
Although these themes are familiar, most of them seem to me to 
be clearly false, at least in the world today. Religion is not "a 
unique source of individual and personal identity"; the hundreds 
of millions of people who have no religious beliefs presumably 
still have individual and personal identities, defined by sundry 
other systems of belief- moral, cultural, ethnic, professional, 
and so on. It also seems dubious that religion is "a unique form 
of public and social identity" as purportedly evidenced by the in-
stitutions that operate in the name of religion. Politics, class, 
ethnicity, cultural traditions, and so on all seem to play the same 
kind of role, in some instances, much more powerfully than relig-
ion does (think of France or England). Where Witte is on to 
something important, I think, is in calling attention to the reli-
gious idea of ''duties that we owe to our Creator, and the man-
ner of discharging them." Many religious commands have a kind 
of normativity, a kind of motivational force for persons-
33. !d. at 133. 
34. /d. at 137-38. 
35. /d. at 138-41. 
36. JOHN WITTE. JR.. RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT 232 (2000). 
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perhaps, but not necessarily, in virtue of their being "owed to [a] 
Creator"- that may, indeed, distinguish them in important ways. 
Following the leads of Macklem and Witte, we might sug-
gest that two features single out "religious" states of mind from 
others. The first pertains to the normativity of (at least some) re-
ligious commands; the second pertains to the relationship be-
tween religious belief and evidence. On the proposed account, 
what distinguishes religious belief from other kinds of beliefs is 
that: 
(1) Religious belief issues in categorical demands on ac-
tion, that is, demands that must be satisfied, no mat-
ter what an individual's antecedent desires and no 
matter what incentives or disincentives the world of-
f 37 d ers up; an , 
(2) Religious beliefs do not answer ultimately (or at the 
limit) to evidence and reasons, as evidence and rea-
sons are understood in other domains concerned 
with knowledge of the world. Religious beliefs, in 
virtue of being based on "faith," are insulated from 
ordinary standards of evidence and rational justifica-
tion, the ones we employ in both common-sense and 
in science.3H 
37. The claim is not that all beliefs commonly denominated ··religious" issue in such 
commands. but that it is characteristic of religion that at least some of the commands in 
which it issues are categorical in character. It may be more accurate. though. to say that 
religious belief issues in as-if categorical demands on action. since it is familiar enough 
that religions can impose other-worldly incentives to produce action in this world that 
seems "as if' it were a response to a categorical reason. when it is really a response to an 
instrumental reason for achieving an other-worldly objective. As Adrienne Martin aptly 
put it to me in correspondence: "an instrumental reason motivates as strongly as the in-
centive on which it is contingent." and other-worldly incentives can. of course. provide a 
very powerful instrumental reason! Indeed. as I note later on. to the extent that a meta-
physics of ultimate reality is also a distinguishing feature of religion. it may supply believ-
ers with instrumental reasons for acting insofar as acting in the right kinds of way enables 
believers to stand in the right kind of relationship to that ultimate reality. 
38. Religious beliefs presumably do answer to evidence in instrumental contexts. 
that is. when there are questions about what means would be effective to the realization 
of the categorical commands of the religion. So. too. one suspects that the interpretation 
of categorical commands is causally influenced by the experiences of the interpreters: so. 
e.g .. "liberation theology" arose as a strand of Catholicism in the context of the horrific 
poverty and vicious oppression that characterized U.S. client states in Latin America af-
ter World War II. But this phenomenon trades on an ambiguity between "evidence" as 
justification for the proposition it supports and "evidence .. as the experiences which ex-
plain why particular propositions are embraced. An adequate socio-historical explana-
tion of liberation theology must. of course. make reference to the climate of social and 
economic oppression in which it arose: but the beliefs constitutive of that religious au-
took were not. themselves. presented as justified by those experiences. (Thanks ~to Sheila 
Sokolowski for raising this issue.) 
16 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 25:1 
I shall refer to this first feature as the categoricity of religious 
commands and the second as religious belief's insulation from 
evidence. The categoricity of religious commands accounts for 
both one of the most admirable and one of the most frightening 
aspects of religious commitment, namely, the willingness of relig-
iously motivated believers to act in accordance with religious 
precepts, notwithstanding the costs. Thus we find the devoutly 
religious among those who were at the forefront of domestic re-
sistance to Nazi oppression in the 1930s,39 and the injustice of 
apartheid in South Africa from the 1960s onward and in Amer-
ica in the 1950s and 1960s.40 We also, of course, find the devoutly 
religious among those who bomb abortion clinics and fly air-
planes into buildings. These religiously inspired individuals risk 
(and often suffer) death, injury, and prison in order to comply 
with their religious conscience. It is painfully familiar, of course, 
that in all these cases adherents of the very same religion con-
tested whether the actions of these believers were sanctioned, let 
alone commanded, by the religious doctrine. (Religious leaders, 
to take but one example, were also at the forefront of defense of 
apartheid in the U.S. in the 1950s and 60s.) The important fact 
here, however, is that religious commands-whether rightly or 
wrongly understood-are taken categorically by their adherents. 
Is religion really alone in this regard? One respect in which 
Marxism may have been rightly called a "religion" is precisely 
that in some of the historical contexts just noted, the only other 
groups as categorically committed to resistance as the religiously 
inspired were Communists, who led resistance to Nazism, as well 
as apartheid in both South Africa and the U.S., long before other 
groups joined the battle. More generally, of course, one might 
think that all commands of morality are categorical in just this 
way. Does that mean, then, that religion is not special after all, 
since it shares the property of categoricity of its commands with 
Marxism and with one common understanding of morality? 
We can easily distinguish the case of moral commands. 41 To 
be sure, there are theoretical understandings of morality-
Kant's most famously, though not only his-according to which 
39. See. e.g .. MARY ALICE GALLIN. ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN THE 
GERMAN RESISTANCE TO HITLER 165-97 (1955). 
40. See, e.g., JOHN W. DE GRUCHY. THE CHURCH STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(2d ed .. 1986); DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND 
THE DEATH OF JIM CROW 87-104 (2004). 
41. We shall. however, return to a further complication about the moral case. be-
low. 
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the demands of morality are indeed categorical. What is interest-
ing and important about religion is that it is one of the few sys-
tems of belief that gives effect to this categoricity. Pure Kantian 
moral agents are few and far between (I think I can count them 
on one hand, and probably have fingers left over!), but those 
who genuinely conduct their lives in accord with the categoricity 
of the moral demands they recognize are overwhelmingly reli-
gwus. 
But not all of them are, of course, and this is where the case 
of Marxists and other similar "believers" become relevant. Here, 
though, we need to attend to the second purportedly distinctive 
feature of religious belief, namely, its insulation from evidence 
and reasons. Whatever the historical and philosophical verdict 
on the evidence and reasons supporting Marxism, one very clear 
difference is that Marxism took itself to be answering to-not in-
sulated from- standards of evidence and reasons in the sciences, 
in a way that religion has not.42 Marx, as is well-known, con-
ceived of his theory as a ''scientific" account of historical change, 
and thus it had to answer to the same standards of evidence and 
justification as any other scientific theory. (That is why it has 
been possible to refute historical materialism by counter-
example.4') Nothing similar, of course, is true of any of the major 
religious traditions: all countenance at least some central beliefs 
which are not ultimately answerable to evidence and reasons as 
these are understood elsewhere (e.g., in common sense, and in 
science). This is why Professor Macklem was correct to empha-
size that the distinctively religious state of mind is that of faith, 
that is, believing something notwithstanding the evidence and 
reasons that fail to support it or even contradict it. 
Even here, of course. we need to be careful. There are, for 
example. "intellectualist" traditions in religious thought- Paley's 
"natural theology" or neo-Thomist arguments come to mind-
according to which religious beliefs (for example, belief in a 
Creator or, as in America recently, belief in "an Intelligent De-
42. I think this is true notwithstanding the unhappy strand of Marxist thought that 
took seriously the Hegelian idea that ''dialectical reason" was a special kind of reason. as 
opposed to a metaphysical dogma. For even the idea of "dialectical reason" took seri-
ously the idea of evidence and rational justification. and. in fact. Hegel's entire philoso-
phical career was an exercise in providing evidence for the purportedlv dialectical struc-
ture of ideological. and thus historical. evolution. That the Hegeiian influence on 
Marxism produced a false picture of evidence and reasons does not alter the fact that 
Marxism took itself to have an obligation to answer to standards of rational justification. 
43. See. e.g .. Joshua Cohen. Book Note. 79 J. PHIL. 253. 266--D8 (1982) (reviewing 
G.A. COHEN. KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE (1978)). 
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signer") are, in fact, supported by the kinds of evidence adduced 
in the sciences, once that evidence is rightly interpreted. It is 
doubtful whether these intellectualist traditions capture the 
character of popular religious belief, but even if they did, there 
remain important senses in which they are still "insulated from 
evidence." First, of course, it is dubious (to the put matter gently) 
that these positions are really serious about following the evi-
dence where it leads, as opposed to manipulating it to fit preor-
dained ends. Second, and relatedly, in the case of the sciences, 
beliefs based on evidence are also revisable in light of the evi-
dence; but in the intellectualist traditions in religious thought 
just noted, there is no suggestion that the fundamental beliefs 
will be revisable in light of new evidence. Religious beliefs are 
purportedly supported by evidence, but they are still insulated 
from revision in light of evidence.44 
Yet there is a different kind of case- pertaining not to the 
under-inclusiveness of the characterization but rather its over-
inclusiveness-that might raise doubts about whether categoric-
ity of commands and insulation from evidence are distinctive fea-
tures of religious belief and practice. Think, for example, of the 
Maoist personality cult that gripped China during the "cultural 
revolution" in the 1960s.45 Here masses of individuals acted on 
commands from Chairman Mao which they took to be, in effect, 
"categorical," and which they carried out without regard to evi-
dence, including evidence of the substantial harms inflicted on 
individuals and, ultimately, society as a whole (though arguably 
evidence of these latter harms was less apparent at the time). 
Does this make the Maoist personality cult a religion? Perhaps 
we should so describe it, yet this seems to run roughshod over 
distinctions it seems worth drawing. Pre-theoretically, after all, 
we might think totalitarian personality cults are distinct from re-
ligions, even if in some historical and cultural contexts their na-
ture and effects are the same. But what marks the difference, 
given that it is not the categorical character of their commands or 
the insulation of their core beliefs from evidence? One plausible 
idea is that religious beliefs not only involve categorical com-
mands and insulation from evidence, but also: 
44. It might be said (as Kenneth Himma pointed out to me) that religious beliefs 
are .. in principle'" revisable: if God thundered from the sky that Heaven and Hell do not 
exist. it might be supposed that this would. in fact. change the minds of some number of 
religious believers. But .. in principle" responsiveness to a kind of evidence that is never 
in the offing seems indistinguishable in practice from insulation from evidence. simplic-
iter. 
45. See. e.g .. TAl SUNG AN. MAO TSE-TuNG'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1972). 
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(3) Religious beliefs involve, explicitly or implicitly, a 
metaphysics of ultimate reality. 
19 
But what is it to endorse a "metaphysics of ultimate real-
it:r"? A metaphysics of an ultimate reality seems to be distin-
guished, in part, by the relationship in which it stands to the em-
pirical evidence of the sciences: namely. that such a view about 
the "essence" or "ultimate nature" of things neither claims sup-
port from empirical evidence, nor purports to be constrained by 
empirical evidence (its claims "transcend" the empirical evi-
dence, hence its '·metaphysical" character). In this regard, 
though, (3) seems to be only a variation on the idea that reli-
gious belief is insulated from evidence- "insulated'' not only in 
the sense that it does not answer to empirical evidence, but also 
in the sense that it does not even aspire to answer to such evi-
dence. 
The latter point may capture the metaphysical character of 
the beliefs, but it is still silent on the sense in which they concern 
ultimate reality. "Ultimate" in this context has less to do. I think, 
with metaphysical gradations of what is essential (whatever that 
would mean) than it does with questions of value: the "ultimate" 
reality is the aspect of reality that is most important for valu-
able/worthwhile/desirable human lives, whether that concerns 
the transcendent well-being of the "soul," or the moral value of 
life in this, the material world. The categoricity of commands dis-
tinctive of religious beliefs are. in turn, related to this metaphys-
ics of ultimate reality in the sense that they specify what must be 
done in order for believers to stand in the right kinds of relations 
to "ultimate reality.'' i.e .. to the reality that makes their lives 
worthwhile and meaningful.4" 
Will the addition of a third distinctive characteristic of reli-
gious belief rule out personality cults of the Maoist variety? 
There is some reason to think so. First, the Maoist-style person-
ality cults may ordinarily be de facto insulated from evidence, 
but they are less often de jure insulated: that is, they purport to 
answer to facts and evidence, in a way that "metaphysical" 
claims about "ultimate" reality do not even purport to do so.47 
Second, the personality cults, focused as they are on the person-
ality of the leader. have an only indirect connection to the nature 
46. In this sense. the as-if categorical reasons mav reallv be instrumental ones. See 
discussion supra note 37. · · 
47. So. e.g .. Mao thought forcing educated professionals to labor in the fields was 
an instrumentally rational approach to promoting the egalitarian values on which the 
communist revolution was based. 
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of ultimate reality, one contingent on the extent to which the 
"leader" is interested in those kinds of questions. To the extent a 
personality cult is de jure insulated from evidence and the "dear 
leader's" commands are directly related to his view of ultimate 
reality, then to that extent we may need to revise the pretheo-
retical intuition (if we share it) that personality cults are differ-
ent from religious beliefs. 
Although a metaphysics of ultimate reality may be the third 
essential feature that distinguishes religious belief from the be-
liefs held by participants in personality cults, for purposes of the 
question of whether there is a principled reason for toleration of 
religion qua religion, only the first two features. I will argue, 
matter. This is because the second feature. insulation from evi-
dence (especially de jure insulation from evidence), already cap-
tures what is significant: namely, the metaphysical character of 
religious beliefs about "ultimate reality." By contrast, so many 
different systems of belief involve views about "ultimate real-
ity" -and such views almost all qualify for toleration under the 
rubric of "conscience" (subject, of course, to the usual side-
constraints)- that the fact that religious beliefs also involve such 
views won't generate any special reason for toleration that does 
not attach in virtue of the first two distinctive features of reli-
gious belief. 
This leaves us, then, with a final possible (and perhaps the 
most worrisome) case of over-inclusiveness in the proposed ac-
count of "religion," namely morality itself. For is not morality 
characterized both by categoricity of its commands and its insu-
lation from reasons and evidence (as reasons and evidence are 
understood, e.g., in the sciences)? Now as noted earlier, cate-
goricity is not necessarily a feature of morality, though it is, to be 
sure, central on many theoretical understandings; and religion, 
as we also observed earlier, may make categoricity socially effec-
tive in a way that it would not otherwise be. But what of "insula-
tion from reasons and evidence"? What we say about morality 
on this score will depend on what we take to be the relevant 
metaphysics and semantics of morality. For cognitivist realists 
like Richard Boyd and Peter Railton,48 for example, moral judg-
ments are not insulated from reasons and evidence as they are 
understood in the sciences-indeed, just the opposite.49 So on 
48. See, e.g., Richard Boyd. How to Be a Moral Realist, in ESSAYS ON MORAL 
REALISM 181 (G. Sayre-McCord ed .. 1988): PETER RAILTON. FACTS. VALUES, AND 
NORMS (2003). 
49. If one takes views like John McDowell's to be instances of cognitivist realism, 
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this view, morality is not at all like religion: it answers to reasons 
and evidence-and answers successfully! Non-cognitivist anti-
realists, by contrast, conceive of moral judgments not as express-
ing beliefs (which might be true or false) but rather as expressing 
mental states that are not truth-apt, i.e., are by their nature insu-
lated from reasons and evidence.50 Religious judgments are still 
different, on this account, since some religious judgments do ex-
press beliefs and so, in principle, could be answerable to reasons 
and evidence, but are held to be insulated from them. So on ei-
ther of the main contenders for a credible metaphysics and se-
mantics of morality, morality is still different from religion. 
If. then, the categoricity of its commands and its insulation 
from evidence (not just de facto, but also de jure) are the distinc-
tive features of religious belief- not, to be clear, the features 
that make religious beliefs important and meaningful to people, 
but rather the features that distinguish religious beliefs from 
other equally important and meaningful beliefs-do the princi-
pled reasons for tolerance reviewed earlier warrant singling re-
ligion out for protection?5' It is to this question that we now turn. 
IV. WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 
We considered, earlier, three categories of principled argu-
ments for toleration: two kinds of moral arguments, one deonto-
logical (illustrated by Rawls), and one utilitarian; and an epis-
then the issue is trickier: but I do not think views like McDowell's are viable accounts of 
the objectivity of morality. for reasons discussed in Brian Leiter. Objectivity, Morality, 
and Adjudication (2001). reprinted in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 225 (2007). I 
shall. in any case. bracket them here. 
50. Moral judgments. to be sure. may still be influenced by evidence, insofar as the 
attitudes expressed presuppose factual claims that answer to evidence. 
51. In the American constitutional literature. another proposal has recently at-
tracted attention. though it suffers. in my view. from an even more extreme problem of 
over-inclusiveness than the proposal considered in the text. On this view-defended, 
most prominently. in Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager, The Vulnerability of 
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct. 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1245 (1994). and in CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE SAGER. RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (2007)-religious belief demands special protec-
tion because it is supposed to be especially vulnerable to discriminatory treatment. But 
special vulnerability to discriminatory treatment can hardly mark out "religious belief" as 
a category of human belief (and concomitant practices) warranting special protections. 
Race and physical disability, to take two obvious cases, make individuals vulnerable to 
discriminatory treatment. probably more often than religious belief and practice: but 
even if we confine our attention to beliefs, there is ample evidence, in terms of legal sanc-
tions and state persecution. that believing in abolitionism. or anarchism, or Communism 
at various points in American history made one at least as vulnerable to discrimination as 
believing in a particular religion. 
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temic argument, exemplified by Mill. If I am right about the fea-
tures that distinguish religious belief, is there any reason to think 
that principled toleration demands tolerance of those beliefs in 
particular? 
I am going to bracket here the Rawlsian moral argument for 
toleration, because I can not see how persons in Rawls's original 
position, operating behind the "veil of ignorance," could reason, 
in particular, about the value of insulation from evidence and the 
categoricity of demands. To be sure, Rawls allows that those in 
the original position do know that they will recognize categorical 
demands, though they do not, of course, know what those will 
be. As Rawls writes: "An individual recognizing religious and 
moral obligations regards them as binding absolutely in the 
sense that he cannot qualify his fulfillment of them for the sake 
of greater means for promoting his other interests."52 But this 
grounds, in Rawls's view, the argument for the general principle 
of equal liberty of conscience- individuals in the original posi-
tion "cannot take chances with their liberty"" as he says-not 
anything specific to religion. Indeed, Rawls repeatedly lumps re-
ligious and moral categoricity together, so that it is fair to say 
that the only thing individuals behind the veil of ignorance know 
is that they will accept some categorical demands, not they will 
accept distinctively religious ones, that is, ones whose grounding 
is a matter of faith. 54 If that is right, then the Rawlsian perspec-
tive can not help us evaluate the principled case for toleration of 
religion qua religion. 
It may also seem that we can dispense with the epistemic ar-
guments for toleration equally quickly. There is no reason to 
think, after all, that tolerating the expression of beliefs that are 
insulated from evidence and reasons-that is, insulated from 
epistemically relevant considerations-will promote knowledge 
of the truth. Bear in mind, though, that Mill is not concerned 
only with knowing the truth, but believing what is true for the 
right kinds of reasons. Perhaps exposure to opinions that are in-
sulated from reasons and evidence is, itself, a spur to better rea-
52. RAWLS. JUSTICE. supra note 11. at 207. 
53. /d. 
54. There is a puzzle. tangential to my concerns here. suggested though by Rawls's 
discussion. Individuals in the original position choose equal liberty of conscience because 
thev can't .. gamble ... id. at 207. on the prospect that their own categorical religious com-
ma~ds will be disfavored in the society in which they find themselves. Yet insofar as they 
endorse equal liberty of conscience, they do have to gamble that their categorical reli-
gious commands will not be fundamentally illiberal ones. i.e .. ones that demand the ex-
termination of heresy and the like. 
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sons for believing what we ought to believe? That is certainly 
possible, but it is hard to see why it is likely to be the case. 
Yet this dismissal of the epistemic argument is too quick." 
For only if we already suppose that the only epistemically rele-
vant considerations are those having to do with evidence and 
reasons as understood in both common-sense and the sciences 
would we be entitled to conclude that beliefs insulated from 
these kinds of considerations do not contribute to knowledge of 
the truth. Indeed, it might seem to be precisely in the spirit of 
Millian epistemic libertarianism to think that alternative epis-
temic methods (or methods that purport to have epistemic pay-
offs) be permitted in the interests of discovering new truths. 
We must be cautious here, however, about the proper ex-
tension of the Millian view. For even Mill, recall, believed that 
there was no epistemic reason for the "free market" of ideas and 
arguments in the case of mathematics (geometry in particular): 
"there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong side of the ques-
tion [in the case of geometry]. The peculiarity of the evidence of 
mathematical truths is that all the argument is on one side. "'h 
This is all the more striking in light of the fact that Mill is a radi-
cal empiricist, and so denies that there is any a priori knowledge: 
even logical and mathematical truths are a posteriori. vindicated 
by inductive generalizations based on past experience. On the 
Millian view, then, there simply would not be any epistemic case 
for making room for, e.g., "mathematics based on faith,'' on the 
grounds that new truths might be uncovered. 
Might we not generalize the point? Because religious belief 
is insulated from the standards of evidence and reasons that have 
been vindicated a posteriori since the scientific revolution, one 
might think that, as with mathematics, there is a Millian reason 
to think that any wholesale departure from these epistemic stan-
dards is tantamount to a wholesale abandonment of epistemi-
cally relevant considerations. as my original formulation of the 
"quick" response proposed originally.'7 Religious belief, on this 
55. I am grateful to Adam Samaha for pressing this point. 
56. MILL. supra note 6. at 34--35. 
57. I take it Quine adopts a similar posture in W.V. QLJINE. PURSl!IT OF TRUTH 
( 1990) when he says that. '"Even telepathy and clairvoyance are scientific options. how-
ever moribund. It would take some extraordinary evidence to enliven them. but. if that 
were to happen. then empiricism itself ... would go by the board. For remember that 
that norm ... are integral to science. and science is fallible and corrigible ... /d. at 20-21. 
But. he then immediately adds. '"it is idle to bulwark definitions [e.g .. of science] against 
implausible contingencies." such as evidence reviving telepathy as a scientific option. !d. 
at 21. 
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account, really is marked by its insulation from the only epis-
temically relevant considerations, the latter point (so it is 
claimed) vindicated a posteriori as in the case of mathematics. 
The claim about a posteriori vindication of certain epistemic 
standards is, itself, a controversial one, and much will ultimately 
turn on the details of what we take the historical record to show. 
So perhaps there is a weaker, but still pertinent, response to the 
challenge to what is supposed to count as epistemically relevant 
considerations for purposes of the Millian epistemic argument 
for toleration. For even if we allow that there is an epistemic 
reason to tolerate purportedly epistemically relevant considera-
tions different than those that figure in common-sense and the 
sciences, there will now be nothing in this argument that singles 
out religious "faith" for special solicitude, since it is only one of a 
multiplicity of non-standard methods that purportedly provide 
access to truths (consider telepathy, talking with the dead, clair-
voyance, etc.). So even if there is a viable epistemic argument for 
toleration of beliefs insulated from the familiar standards of evi-
dence and reasons, that argument does not help single out reli-
gious belief for special protection. 
Of course, on the Millian view, there is a second kind of 
epistemic goal at issue-namely, knowing how one ought to 
live-a kind of knowledge requiring "experiments in [different 
kinds of] living." Perhaps, then, a different epistemic argument 
for tolerance of religious beliefs in particular is that living in ac-
cord with categorical demands that are unhinged from reasons 
and evidence is one of the "experiments" we ought to encourage 
through a regime of toleration?58 
Toleration, however, operates under side-constraints, as we 
noted earlier. Being a genocidal white supremacist, after all, is 
an "experiment in living," but the Millian (or even the Rawlsian) 
argument from toleration does not suppose that we ought to tol-
erate that experiment given the harm it can be reasonably ex-
pected to cause. And that brings us to the absolute crux of the 
issue as to whether there is a special reason to tolerate religion 
qua religion. If what distinguishes religious beliefs from other 
58. Many, perhaps most, religious believers in the industrialized nations these days 
embrace only a "softer" version of these kinds of beliefs: unhinged from evidence, yes, 
but much more rarely categorical in their commands. If there are reasons for tolerating 
these "experiments in living"- as there presumably are- it seems unlikely they are going 
to be peculiar to this "softer" form of religious belief and practice, which is harder to dis-
tinguish from other exercises of conscience that figure in people's lives. The focus in the 
text is on the core, distinctive case of religious belief. 
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important and meaningful beliefs held by individuals is that reli-
gious beliefs are both insulated from evidence and issue in cate-
gorical demands on action, then isn't there reason to worry that 
religious belief, as against other matters of conscience, are far 
more likely to cause harms and infringe on liberty? 
Now such a demeaning conclusion about religious belief 
would certainly be congenial to many non-believers, but I won-
der whether it is warranted. It is true that the combination of 
categorical demands on action and indifference to evidence seems 
a frightening one, as it can often be, but is there any reason to 
think that attention to evidence precludes embrace of abhorrent 
categorical demands? Or, to put the point differently: why think 
the evidence would thwart grossly unjust categorical demands? 
This raises vexed philosophical questions-for example, 
does knowledge of the facts require certain moral responses, 
such that people sensitive to the evidence would not be capable 
of the atrocities so commonly perpetrated by religious zealots?-
but we may bracket those here. For from the standpoint of a 
principled argument for toleration, the question is slightly differ-
ent. The question is not whether toleration of categorical de-
mands on action conjoined with indifference to evidence stands in 
the requisite causal nexus with harm or infringements of liberty 
such that we would be justified in not tolerating those kinds of 
beliefs. Rather, the question is whether there is any special rea-
son to tolerate beliefs whose distinctive character is defined by 
the categoricity of its demands conjoined with its insulation from 
evidence? That is, we are still looking for a principled argument 
for tolerating religion qua religion; only if we found such an ar-
gument, would we then have to address the question about the 
limits of that principle of toleration by reference to side-
constraints. If it is true that beliefs that support categorical de-
mands which are insulated from evidence have a special potential 
for harms to well-being, then that would be reason to doubt 
whether any utilitarian argument for tolerating religion qua re-
ligion will succeed. 
The worry, baldly stated then, comes to this: there may be 
compelling principled reasons for the state to respect liberty of 
conscience, but there is no apparent moral reason why states 
should carve out special protections that encourage individuals 
to structure their lives around categorical demands that are insu-
lated from the standards of evidence and reasoning we every-
where else expect to constitute constraints on judgment and ac-
tion. Singling out religion for toleration is tantamount to 
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thinking we ought to encourage precisely this conjunction of 
categorical fervor based on epistemic indifference. And it is hard 
to see what utilitarian rationale there could be for that.59 
Where does that conclusion leave us, then? First, it suggests 
that there is no principled reason for legal or constitutional re-
gimes to single out religion for protection; there is no moral or 
epistemic consideration that favors special legal solicitude to-
wards beliefs that conjoin categorical commands with insulation 
from evidence. Second, the general principled arguments for tol-
eration noted earlier, both the broadly Rawlsian and Millian 
ones, do justify legal protection for liberty of conscience, which 
would necessarily encompass toleration of religious beliefs. 
Third, and perhaps most controversially, the general reasons for 
being skeptical that there are special reasons to tolerate religion 
qua religion (because of the special potential for harm that at-
taches to the conjunction of categorical demands based on beliefs 
insulated from evidence) suggest that we must be especially alert 
to the limits of religious toleration imposed by the side-
constraints. 
How these theoretical conclusions about principled tolera-
tion should play out in the practical realm of legal regulation is a 
59. It may be useful to consider the recent Canadian kirpan-in-the-schools case 
(Multani. [2006]1 S.C.R. 256. 2006 SCC 6) in light of these points. Although the Cana-
dian Supreme Court allowed that the kirpan "undeniably has characteristics of a bladed 
weapon capable of wounding or killing a person" id. at para. 37; that many Sikhs "wear a 
plastic or wooden kirpan" id. at para. 39, which does not present these risks: and that car-
rying kirpans is. properly. prohibited in courts and on airplanes, id. at paras. 62--M. the 
Court nonetheless held that the student in question could carry the most dangerous kind 
of kirpan as long as "his personal and subjective belief in the religious significance of the 
kirpan is sincere" id. at para. 37. including his "sincere" belief that wearing a plastic or 
wooden kirpan will not suffice-since adherents of a religion '"may adhere to the dogma 
and practices of that religion to varying degrees of rigour'" id. at para. 39. apparently free 
from scrutiny by the state. 
The extent to which the state must defer to the "dogma" of a "sincere" believer-
whose beliefs issue in categorical commands unhinged from evidence (hence their dog-
matic character)-is perhaps most apparent in the Court's peculiar discussion of why the 
school setting is different than courtrooms and airplanes. Although there are obvious 
differences between these environments, the Court laid most emphasis on its romantic 
view of schools as places where "both teachers and students are partners" rather than 
adversaries. such that it is "possible to better control the different types of situations that 
arise in schools." !d. at para. 65 (citing Pandori v. Peel Bd. of Education (1990), 12 
C.H.R.R. D/364 at para. 197). Quite remarkably, no mention is made of the pertinent 
differences that might count in favor of stricter restrictions in schools, such as: the ab-
sence of armed guards in many schools all of the time, and in all schools in at least some 
places some of the time; the literal immaturity and concomitant problems with impulse 
control characteristic of school populations; as well as the antagonistic relationships 
among students. and between teachers and students, that surely exist as often as the ro-
mantic "partnerships" the Court envisions. 
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complicated question that I plan to address in a separate paper.(,() 
In the latter context, we will have to remain especially alert to 
non-principled considerations, such as Schauer's worry about 
"governmental incompetence," which may seem particularly 
acute in this context, as they are in the context of free speech. 
There may, indeed, be no moral or epistemic reason why the 
state should give special consideration to private beliefs which 
issue in categorical demands that are unhinged from reasons and 
evidence. But as a practical matter, what reason is there to think 
that government will correctly identify that class of beliefs? Sec-
tarian bias and prejudice are surely likely to co-opt principled 
arguments for unprincipled ends.61 It may turn out there is no 
principled reason to tolerate religion qua religion, but there may 
still be compelling practical reasons to think the alternatives are 
worse. 
60. It will be particularly important to distinguish questions about the accommoda-
tion of religious practices (for example. by exempting religious practitioners from gener-
ally applicable laws) from questions about the establishment (or state endorsement) of 
religion. Accommodation arguments may find their grounding in very different consid-
erations than those adduced here pertaining to religious toleration. So. e.g .. Martha 
Nussbaum argues, plausibly enough. that "equal respect" considerations are likely to 
demand substantial religious accommodation. given the ease with which "neutralitv" 
considerations will favor the de facto dominant religious culture. See generally MARTHA 
NUSSBAUM. LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008). 
61. That fact might be thought to lend support to the Eisgruber and Sager argu-
ment discussed earlier (supra note 51). But the question there was whether vulnerabilit1· 
to discrimination was adequate to mark out religion as deserving special legal protectio~. 
and the answer to that question is unaffected by the fact that religion. like so manv other 
kinds of human beliefs and practices. may be susceptible to discrimination: what ~atters 
for the point in the text is that religion is vulnerable to discrimination. not that it is espe-
cially or uniquely so vulnerable. 
